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December 1964] Notes 
The Role of a Trial Jury in Determining the 
Voluntariness of a Confession 
381 
The Supreme Court of the United States has vigorously imple-
mented the principle that criminal prosecution is an investigative, 
not an inquisitorial, process. Evidence of guilt must be obtained by 
methods free from physical or psychological coercion.1 Protections 
in the Bill of Rights against illegal search and seizure,2 self-incrim-
ination,8 and trial without counsel4 have been extended to the states 
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Safe-
guards against the admissibility of coerced confessions into evidence 
have also been instituted.5 Because a confession practically deter-
mines the ultimate question of guilt, 6 the critical standards for· 
admissibility are frequently challenged on appeal.7 Three proce-
dural methods for determining voluntariness have been employed: 
the orthodox, the Massachusetts, and the New York rules.8 Under 
the orthodox rule, the trial judge determines voluntariness after 
hearing all of the evidence on that issue. If the confession is admitted 
by the judge, the jury then considers its probative value.9 The 
1. "[O]urs is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the 
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not 
by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth." Rogers v. 
Richmond, !l65 U.S. 5!l4, 541 (1961). See, e.g., Blackbum v. Alabama, !l61 U.S. 199, 
206-07 (1960); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952); Watts v. Indiana, 338 
U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949). 
2. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). See generally Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for 
Wolf, 1961 SUPREME COURT REv. 1 (Kurland ed.). 
3. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
4. See, e.g., Escobedo v. State, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963). See generally BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955). 
5. See Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal 
Justice, U. Chi. Law School Record (Special Supp.), Autumn 1958, pp. 10-13. See 
generally MASON & BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY 217-84 (1959); 
Scott, State Criminal Procedure, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Prejudice, 49 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 319 (1954). 
6. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDCNCE § 821 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. 
7. Since 1936, the Supreme Court has heard over forty appeals on confession issues. 
For a collection of confession cases, see Way, The Supreme Court and State Coerced 
Confessions, 12 J. Pun. L. 53, app. table 2 (1963) (listing thirty-two). See, e.g., Escobedo 
v. State, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Haynes v. Wash-
ington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
8. The states are divided rather evenly. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 410-23 
(1964) (separate opinion). But not all the states and federal judicial circuits can be 
classified within these three procedures. Some jurisdictions leave the choice to the 
discretion of the trial judge; others vary the rule on different occasions. See id. at 378 
n.9, 396-400; 3 WIGMORE § 861 n.3; Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation 
of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 319 &: n.11, 323-24 
(1954). 
9. See Jackson v. Denno, supra note 8, at 378; id. at 411-14 (separate opinion); 
3 WIGMORE § 861; 9 id. § 2550; Meltzer, supra note 8, at 320-21; Comment, The Role 
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Massachusetts rule similarly requires the judge to pass initially on 
admissibility, but the jury must also find the confession voluntary 
before it may consider the credibility of the confession.10 Under the 
New York procedure, however, the judge leaves the question of ad-
missibility to the jury when there is a factual dispute concerning 
voluntariness over which reasonable men could differ. If the jury 
finds the confession involuntary, it must reach its verdict on the 
other evidence,11 disregarding the confession. In Jackson v. Denno,12 
the United States Supreme Court, while expressing approval of both 
the orthodox and the Massachusetts procedures, held that the New 
York rule is unfair and unreliable in permitting the jury to deter-
mine both voluntariness and guilt and, consequently, that the New 
Yark rule deprives the defendant of liberty without due process of 
law. 
The defendant in Jackson robbed a Brooklyn hotel and shot a 
policeman while escaping. Wounded himself, the defendant went to 
a local hospital where preoperative sedatives, demorol and scopola-
mine, were administered to him.13 Immediately thereafter, he was 
interrogated, and he confessed. This confession and corroborating 
testimony were introduced into evidence at the New York state trial 
without objection by defense counsel,14 although an attempt was 
made to impeach the credibility of the confession by proving the 
defendant's wounded and drugged condition.15 Because the de-
fendant's condition and testimony presented a factual dispute on the 
voluntariness of the confession, this issue was submitted to the jury 
with instructions that it consider the probative value of the confes-
of Judge and Jury in Determining a Confession's Voluntariness, 48 J. CRIM. L., C, 
& P.S. 59, 60 (1957). 
10. See Jackson v. Denno, supra note 8, at 378 n.8; id. at 417-20 (separate opinion); 
Meltzer, supra note 8, at 323. See also Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the 
Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REv. 165 (1929). 
11. See Jackson v. Denno, supra note 8, at 377; id. at 414-17 (separate opinion); 
Meltzer, supra note 8, at 321-23. See also Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of 
Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REv. 392 (1927). 
12. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Mr. Justice Black concurred in a separate opinion. Justices 
Clark, Harlan, and Stewart dissented. 
13. Jackson was given fifty milligrams of demorol and one-fiftieth of a grain of 
scopolamine. Demorol, given intraveneously, makes a patient "dopey" immediately, 
and, taken with scopolamine, it intensifies drowsiness, impairs alertness, and produces 
an amnestic effect. Furthermore, scopolamine has the effect of "truth serum." See 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 302, 308 & n.5 (1963); Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14-15, 
Jackson v. Denno, supra note 8. See generally Comment, Admissibility of Confessions 
and Denials Made Under the Influence of Drugs, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 666 (1957); Note, 30 
BROOKLYN L. REv. Ill (1963); Note, 16 OKLA. L. REv. 431 (1963). Since Jackson's dosage 
was twice the amount given to the defendant in the Townsend case supra, the 
Supreme Court could easily have ordered a hearing on voluntariness as it did in 
Townsend. However, the Court in Jackson ignored this simple ground for reversal, it 
would seem, in order to modify the rules of evidence. 
14. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 8, at 374 & n.4; id. at 423-25 (dissenting opinion). 
15. Id. at 374 & n.4; id. at 423-25 (dissenting opinion). 
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sion only if it was first found voluntary. The jury found the 
defendant guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to 
death.16 The constitutionality of the New York rule in permitting 
this confession to be submitted to the jury was first questioned in 
defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district 
court. The denial of this petition was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit.17 The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that state and federal hearings on voluntariness may be conducted 
by the trial judge, another judge, or an independently convened 
jury, but not by the trial jury.18 
The rationale of the majority opinion is that jury deliberations 
on voluntariness may be unreliable and unfair to defendants.19 Be-
cause the jury hears all the testimony under the New York proce-
dure, evidence corroborating the reliability and credibility of a con-
fession might influence its determination of voluntariness. This 
would be prejudicial error because the sensitive constitutional stan-
dards for voluntariness require that this finding be made without 
extraneous evidence going to its reliability.20 Moreover, even if the 
jury finds the confession involuntary, the possibility exists that it 
may still be influenced by the confession in assessing the other evi-
dence to reach a verdict.21 In addition, when the issue of voluntari-
ness is resolved by the trial jury, findings of fact cannot be ascer-
tained from the general verdict; consequently, an appellate court 
16. People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 780, 219 N.Y.S.2d 621, 177 N.E.2d 59, motion to 
amend remittitur granted and remittitur modified, 10 N.Y.2d 816, 221 N.Y.S.2d 521, 
178 N.E.2d 234, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 949 (1961). 
17. In re Jackson, 206 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd sub nom., United States ex rel. 
Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd sub nom., Jackson v. Denno, 378 
U.S. 368, 370 (1964). Failure to contest a constitutional issue in the state courts does 
not preclude a federal hearing on a writ of habeas corpus unless the issue was avoided 
deliberately in the state court. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-27, 439 (1963). But see 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 424-25 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
18. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 17, at 391 &: n.19. 
19. See id. at 390-91. 
20. See id. at 390. The holding is narrowly confined to voluntariness of confessions, 
although the breadth of the Court's rationale in questioning a jury's capability to judge 
admissibility solely on the issue of voluntariness and to disregard confessions found to 
be involuntary suggests a wider scope. It is probable that other admissions short of 
confessions will be treated like confessions in determining voluntariness. See United 
States ex rel. Gomino v. Maroney, 231 F. Supp. 154, 157 (W.D. Pa. 1964); State v. Owen, 
94 Ariz. 404, 409, 385 P.2d 700, 703 (1963), vacated sub nom., Owen v. Arizona, 378 
U.S. 574 (per curiam), rev'd on remand sub nom., State v. Owen, 394 P.2d 206 (Ariz. 
1964); Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 19 WASH.&: LEE L. REv. 35, 37 (1962). However, it seems doubtful that this case 
presages the application of the orthodox rule to dying declarations and other evidence 
where admissibility may also determine the outcome of the suit. 
21. See Jackson v. Denno, supra note 17, at 380-89. The Court overruled Stein v. 
New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), which had upheld the New York procedure despite its 
acknowledged shortcomings. Stein rested on the premise that coerced confessions were 
inadmissible only because they were unreliable. Thus, it followed that evidence con-
cerning the trustworthiness of a confession was relevant and that a jury could consider 
both credibility and voluntariness together. 
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can only speculate on which evidence actually led to the verdict of 
guilty.22 Finally, under the New York procedure an accused is handi-
capped in testifying before a jury about police coercion because the 
prosecution's permitted cross-examination23 may disclose a record of 
prior convictions which otherwise would not reach the jury.24 
The majority opinion, however, does not emphasize what might 
be regarded as a major secondary effect of rejecting the New York 
rule. Requiring a hearing on voluntariness that is independent of 
the trial jury will facilitate federal review of state confession cases, 
enabling the federal courts more easily to enforce the constitutional 
criteria for voluntariness, and thus effectuate the Court's goals of 
deterring "third degree" methods and protecting the individual's 
right of privacy against police interference. The Supreme Court has, 
by interpretation, expanded the applicability of federal habeas 
corpus writs for reviewing the voluntariness issue.25 Federal district 
courts have been broadly directed to conduct a trial de novo on the 
voluntariness issue. when the state trier-of-fact fails to provide a full 
and fair evidentiary hearing.26 Under the orthodox and Massachu-
setts rules, the trial record reveals whether the constitutional stan-
dards for voluntariness are satisfied because the trial judge makes the 
determinations of law and the findings of fact.27 Under the New 
York rule, however, the general verdicts and typically cursory jury 
instructions28 do not clarify the applicable findings of fact and 
rulings of law, and thus they are not easily reviewed to ascertain 
22. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 17, at 380; accord, Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 
156, 177 (1953). 
23. See Jackson v. Denno, supra note 17, at 389 n.16 (dictum); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 
89-94 (1954); Meltzer, supra note 8, at 332-33. But cf. United States v. Carignan, !142 
U.S. 36, 38 (1951); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21 (limiting evidence of prior convictions 
to crimes involving dishonesty and false statements). 
24. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 123 F.2d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd on 
other grounds, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Meltzer, supra note 8, at 333 n.71. 
25. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (196!1), 
See generally Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court 
1958 Term, 73 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 84, 101-25 (1959); Pollak, Proposals To Curtail Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 
50 (1956); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 
HARV. L. REv. 1315 (1961); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 
HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1, 17-26 (1956). 
26. Townsend v. Sain, supra note 25, at 312-13, 317-18. 
27. Both rules require that the judge's determination of voluntariness be reflected 
in the trial record. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1964). With the law and 
the facts enunciated, federal district courts may conveniently review allegations of error 
in habeas corpus petitions. 
28. See, e.g., id. at 375 n.5: "[I]f you should decide that it was gotten by influence, of 
fear produced by threats, ... then reject it.'' United States ex rel. McNerlin v. Denno, 
214 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 324 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1963), vacated on other 
grounds, 378 U.S. 575 (1964) (per curiam): "If it was the result of the use of threats or 
fear, regardless of how true the statement may be, you may not consider it . . • .'' 
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 517 n.13 (1963): "[A confession is voluntary] except 
when made under the influence of fear produced by threats •... " Cf. Meltzer, supra 
note 8, at 342. 
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voluntariness. Removing this shield of ambiguity will force trial 
courts to articulate the law and the findings of fact in detail, thereby 
permitting convenient and meaningful appellate review.29 
In simply overturning the New York rule, without enunciating 
guidelines on many collateral issues raised by its holding, the Su-
preme Court was silent upon a series of pro]llems that seem certain 
to be the subject of future litigation. First, although in theory the 
Massachusetts approach may aid the defendant because both the 
judge and the jury must separately find the confession voluntary 
before it may be admitted, in practice this procedure may have 
many of the objectionable characteristics of the New York rule. 
Under the Massachusetts rule, a trial judge, knowing that the jury 
must also pass on voluntariness, may have a tendency to resolve diffi-
cult factual disputes by finding the confession voluntary,30 thus 
allowing the jury to make the final decision, even though the jury 
may thereby be swayed by the reliability of the confession or other 
evidence of guilt in determining voluntariness. On the other hand, if 
the trial judge instructs the jury that he has already found the con-
fession to be voluntary, it seems likely that a jury will be influenced 
by the judge's findings, and thus the advantage of the Massachusetts 
rule to a defendant is minimized.31 Second, under the orthodox ap-
proach, it is arguable that a defendant is deprived of his constitu-
tionally protected right to a trial by jury because the judge must 
make the factual determinations on voluntariness,32 a decision that 
often determines the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Third, the 
majority opinion in Jackson fails to indicate which of the three 
burdens of persuasion-the preponderance of evidence, clear and 
convincing proof, or beyond a reasonable doubt33-should be em-
ployed by the trier-of-fact as the constitutional standard for deter-
mining voluntariness. If a trial judge, for example, admits a con-
fession under the preponderance burden and instructs the jury that 
the confession is voluntary, the jury, by relying on the confession, 
may convict a defendant on less than proof beyond a reasonable .. 
29. Cf. Brennan, The Judge's Supervisory Role, 2 AMERICAN CRIM. L. Q. 53, 57-59 
(1964). 
30. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 436-38 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Meltzer, 
supra note 8, at 329-30; Ritz, supra note 20, at 55-57. 
31. See Jackson v. Denno, supra note 30, at 404 (Black, J., separate opinion); Brief 
for Petitioner, p. 9, id.; Meltzer, supra note 8, at 329-30; Comment, The Role of Judge 
and Jury in Determining a Confession's 'Voluntariness, 48 J. CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 59, 
64 (1957). 
32. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 30, at 405-08 (Black, J., separate opinion). 
33. Of tbe few courts tbat have considered tbe issue at tbe appellate level, tbe 
jurisdictions are split among tbe tbree rules. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 206 F. Supp. 759, 
762 (S.D.N.Y.) ("clear and conclusive proof''), afj'd sub nom., United States ex rel. 
Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Jack-
son v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); People v. Sammons, 17 Ill. 2d 316, 319, 161 N.E.2d 
322, 324 (1959) C'preponderance of tbe evidence"); State v. Stewart, 238 La. 1036, 
1046, 117 So. 2d 583, 586 (1960) ("beyond a reasonable doubt''). 
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doubt.84 Finally, a number of decisions under the Massachusetts 
system indicate that the judge may determine the voluntariness of a 
confession in the presence of the jury.85 It would seem, however, 
almost a necessary implication from the rationale of the Jackson 
holding that, because juries are likely to be influenced by knowledge 
of an involuntary confession, all hearings on voluntariness by the 
judge must be outside of their presence.86 
The Supreme Court in Jackson was also silent on whether the 
burden of proof for voluntariness is upon the prosecution or the de-
fendant, even though the proper allocation of this burden seems 
essential in order to achieve the Court's declared goal of fair and 
reliable hearings and though the states are divided on this issue.87 
The parties' access to evidence and their ability to aid counsel should 
be determinative of this question.88 While an accused may fully 
understand the circumstances surrounding a confession, the large 
number of cases in which the facts are disputed or unknown justify 
placing the burden on the prosecution. During detention and in-
terrogation, the accused is likely to be in a highly emotional condi-
34. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 405 (1964) (Black, J., separate opinion). 
35. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 268 F.2d 416, 420 (9th Cir. 1959); People v. 
Gonzales, 24 Cal. 2d 870, 877, 151 P.2d 251, 255 (1944); State v. Tassiello, 39 N.J. 282, 
291, 188 A.2d 406, 411 (1963). The Court relied heavily upon the inability of the jury 
to disregard an involuntary confession in reaching a verdict, yet failed to stipulate 
that the jury be excluded during testimony before the judge on voluntariness. But 
cf. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 34, at 390 &: n.18. Following the Court's rationale of 
jury waywardness, it is unclear why defendant would not be prejudiced by the 
mention of a "confession" within the jury's hearing. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 
330; cf. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951) (defendant in federal prosecu-
tion may testify out of jury's presence). 
36. See State v. Owen, 394 P .2d 206, 207 (Ariz. 1964). Owen interpreted Jackson 
as holding that all testimony on voluntariness must be out of the jury's hearing. 
But see People v. Milford, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1964), which 
interprets Jackson to permit the jury to determine voluntariness when the confession 
is the only evidence against the defendant. Milford seems unjustifiable and inconsis-
tent with the principal case. It also seems to reflect the ambiguities of Jackson and 
the shortcomings of the Court's guidelines for evidentiary procedures in this chaotic 
area of criminal law. 
37. A strong minority of the jurisdictions in which the issue has been resolved 
place the burden on the defendant to show that the confession was involuntary. See, 
e.g., Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 74, 328 S.W.2d 836, 839 (1959); Britt v. State, 242 Ind. 
548, 555-56, 180 N.E.2d 235, 239 (1962); Commonwealth v. Beaulieu, 333 Mass. 640, 
655, 133 N.E.2d 226, 235, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 957 (1956). Another group of states 
require only that the prosecution make a prima facie showing of voluntariness before 
the burden shifts to the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Preis, 89 Ariz. 336, 338, 362 P.2d 
660, 661, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 934 (1961); Cochran v. State, 117 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. 
1960); People v. Davis, IO Ill. 2d 430, 440, 140 N.E.2d 675, 682, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
820 (1957). Compare United States ex rel. McNerlin v. Denno, 214 F. Supp. 480 (S.D. 
N.Y.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 378 U.S. 575 (1964) 
(per curiam). 
38. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 321 n.18. The determination of where the burden 
of evidence shall lie is generally resolved by considerations of fairness and public 
policy. See, e.g., McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 672-76 (1954); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE-COMMON 
SENSE AND COMMON LAW 179 (1947); MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYS!EM OF LITIGATION 75-76 (1956); 9 WIGMORE § 2486. 
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tion39 and is often under a physical or mental disability.4° Circum-
stances surrounding arrests, detentions, and interrogations may be 
confusing and secretive.41 As a result, the police probably have better 
access to the evidence, including witnesses and records, that can 
establish voluntariness.42 In addition, requiring the prosecution to 
prove voluntariness will help deter illegal police methods, consistent 
with the reasoning behind the exclusionary rule,43 because the offi-
cers involved will know that they may have to testify in detail about 
how the confession was obtained.44 
It is not clear that the due process deficiencies which the Court 
found in the New York rule will be corrected by an independent 
adjudication of voluntariness. The fairest and most reliable delibera-
tion would be by a second jury that considers only the single issue 
of voluntariness without testimony concerning the credibility of the 
confession.45 This procedure, however, is unlikely to be utilized be-
cause of the added delay and expense.46 The alternative, a judge 
determination, creates problems of fairness and reliability.47 The 
judge faces the same difficulty as the jury in excluding a confession 
when the coercion is slight and the defendant is clearly guilty, and 
he may give sizeable, unrecorded weight to a confession's accuracy 
in determining voluntariness.48 Judges may also have extra-judicial 
knowledge of the defendant's record and conduct, supplementing 
39. See, e.g., Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958) (five-hundred interrogation im-
mediately after husband's funeral); cf. INBAU &: REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND 
CONFESSIONS 29-34 (1962). 
40. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 373 (1964) (sedatives and truth 
serum); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1963) (narcotics); Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620 (1961) (mentally handicapped); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 
433, 437 (1961) (sick); Pea v. United States, 324 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam), 
vacated on other grounds, 378 U.S. 571 (1964) (per curiam) (wounded); Bell v. United 
States, 47 F.2d 438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (alcohol). 
41. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 575 (1961) (dictum); Weisberg, 
Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM, L., C. &: P.S. 
21, 44-46 (1961); cf. Way, supra note 7, at 60-61. 
42. See INBAU &: REID, op. cit. supra note 39, at 135-39; Goldstein, The State and 
the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149-50 (1960). 
43. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1963); Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961); Ritz, supra note 20, at 42-43. 
44. Compare United States ex rel. McNerlin v. Denno, 214 F. Supp. 480, 482-86 
(S.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 46, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 378 U.S. 
575 (1964) (per curiam). The prosecution met its prima facie burden with only one 
witness. Defendant contradicted the witness by testifying about police coercion. The 
state did not call any of the other witnesses to the confession. Forcing the state to 
produce all available witnesses would enable the trial and reviewing courts to 
ascertain more clearly the voluntariness of the confession. 
45. Cf. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 124-34 (1962). 
46. Cf. id. at 73-75, 222-33. 
47. The Supreme Court willingly assumes the integrity of proceedings before a 
judge, yet rejects the reliability and trustworthiness of the jury. Jackson v. Denno, 
!178 U.S. 368, 378 n.8, 381-82 (1964). 
48. Cf, Schaefer, supra note 25, at 13-14. 
388 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63 
the testimony on the reliability of the confession.49 Moreover, some 
trial judges may feel obligated to support local police officers, 
whereas the jury is unburdened by considerations of police morale. 
Whether a judge will accept an accused's claim of coercion, over 
denials by local police, as readily as a jury is uncertain. It would 
seem possible, therefore, that judge deliberations on voluntariness 
are little fairer or more reliable to a defendant than jury determina-
tions under the New York rule. 
As in other recent criminal cases,50 the Supreme Court in Jackson 
did not rule upon the retroactive effect of its holding. Despite the 
unconstitutional evidentiary procedure, the Court did not grant the 
petitioner a new trial but rather remanded the case to a New York 
state court for a fair hearing on the issue of voluntariness. This dis-
position of the case reflected a recent technique for splitting litigation 
to aid judicial administration.51 Application of this technique to 
confession cases seems to manifest an intention that the holding in 
Jackson be employed retroactively since bifurcating the voluntariness 
issue from the trial process will facilitate rehearings on all past con-
victions based upon confessions under the New York rule.52 
Given other recent Supreme Court decisions concerning indi-
vidual rights in criminal prosecutions,58 the standards of the exclu-
sionary rule for coerced confessions and the privilege against self-
49. Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
50. See Escobedo v. State, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (refusal to let defendant consult with 
counsel during interrogation violates due process); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964) 
(fifth amendment against self-incrimination extended to states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But see Norvell v. Illinois, 
373 U.S. 420 (1963) (limiting the retroactive application of the requirement that 
trial transcripts be provided to indigents); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 U.S. 
214 (1958) (per curiam) (providing indigents with trial transcripts retroactively). 
Compare Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963) 
(Mapp applied retroactively), with United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 
11 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 930 (1964) (Mapp not applied retroactively). 
See generally Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: 
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962); Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). 
51. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 410 (1964) (separate opinion); id. at 426 
(Clark, J., dissenting); United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233 (1957). 
52. Generally in confession cases, the Supreme Court has reversed convictions 
obtained with unconstitutional procedures in accordance with the "automatic reversal 
rule." See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 344. Compare United States ex rel. Gomino v. 
Maroney, 231 F. Supp. 154, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (applying Jackson retroactively), with 
People v. Milford, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1964) (refusing to 
apply Jackson retroactively). Because of the Court's willingness to hear constitutional 
issues not raised at the trial or appellate levels, it would be inconsistent to limit 
the retroactive application of Jackson to those cases where the issue was previously 
raised. See Tucker, The Supreme Court and the Indigent Defendant, 37 So. CAL. L. 
REv. 151, 178 (1964); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-27, 439 (1963). 
53. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Comment, The Coerced Con-
fession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 313, 320-26 (1964), which 
develops arguments for equality of conditions between the prosecutor and the 
accused before a trial. 
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incrimination seem to be merging.154 Dicta in Malloy v. Hogan1515 
asserts that the voluntariness issue is controlled by the privilege 
against self-incrimination,116 a position which most commentators 
favor.117 In the near future, the Court may hold that a defendant has 
a constitutional privilege against the admission and use of a confes-
sion in a criminal trial unless he intelligently and freely waives this 
privilege.118 It seems, however, that the Court should expand its 
requirements for waiver of a privilege against confessions slowly, 
paralleling the improvements in police investigative techniques.119 
Gradually, the Supreme Court may expunge the remnants of the 
inquisitorial system and achieve an investigative criminal procedure. 
54. The history of the two rules differ, and, in practice, the two doctrines have 
separate boundaries. See 3 WIGMORE § 823; id. §§ 2250, 2266 (McNaughton rev. 
1961). However, in principle, the resemblance is unavoidable. See id. §§ 2252 n.27, 2266. 
"[T]he privilege, with its unclear boundaries and apparently unending capacity for 
transmogrification and assimilation, is now sometimes invoked to effect exclusion even 
though the disclosure was not compelled from a person under legal compulsion." 
Id. § 2266, at 402. 
55. 378 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964); cf. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951) 
(leaving open the application of the fifth amendment to confessions); Bram v. United 
States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 208 (1953) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
56. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 7 (1964). 
57. The arguments advanced for extending the privilege to confessions are sum-
marized in 8 W1cMoRE, § 2252 n2.7 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Authorities favoring 
such an extension include: MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 203, 232 (1942); UNIFORM 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 25; McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 228-29 (1954); Morgan, The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. I, 27-30 (1949); Weisberg, supra note 41, 
at 46. Contra, 3 WIGMORE § 823. See generally FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGH'IS 
175-85 (1958); Scott, Federal Control Over Use of Coerced Confessions in State Criminal 
Cases-Some Unsettled Problems, 29 IND. L.J. 151, 153-54 (1954); Comment, The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Does It Exist in the Police Station?, 5 STAN. L. 
REv. 459 (1953). 
58. The voluntariness standard now appears to be so sensitive that police refusal 
of any reasonable request constitutes coercion. See, e.g., Escobedo v. State, 378 U.S. 
478 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). The clearest indication of a 
relinquishment of a privilege against extra-judicial confessions would be the waiver 
test in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938). Cf. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 
U.S. 49 (1962). If the requirement to provide counsel is extended to the moment of 
detention, it could be argued that extra-judicial confessions might categorically be 
held inadmissible without substantially interfering further with the prosecuting attor-
ney. Cf. People v. Dorado, 61 Cal. 2d 892, 394 P2.d 952 (1964). 
59. The realistic needs of public safety should be considered. See, e.g., Hall, Police 
and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L. J. 133, 161-77 (1953); Inbau, Rt;strictions 
in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 80-82 (1957); 
Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 
CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964); cf. Barrett, Police Practice and the Law-From Arrest to 
Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 11 (1962). 
